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COMMENT 
Community Property after Hisquierdo 
v. Hisquierdo 
MARIE STEFANINI NEWMAN and PATRICIA SCHULTHEISS* 
The division of property upon divorce in com- 
munity property states1 has been affected by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Hisquierdo u. His- 
quierdoY2 which was handed down in January 
1979. Hisquierdo held that a Railroad Retirement 
Act pension, which under California community 
property law was the property of both spouses, 
divisible upon divorce, was the separate property 
of the spouse who earned it. This pre-emption of 
California community property law by the Rail- 
- - 
road Retirement Act deprived the other spouse of 
any interest whatsoever in the pension benefits. 
Jess H. Hisquierdo filed a petition to dissolve his 
marriage to Angela Hisquierdo in January 1975.3 
At the time of the dissolution of marriage hearing 
in 1975, Mr. Hisquierdo was fifty-five, and Mrs. 
* Marie Stefanini Newman, Rutgers University School 
of Law-Newark, Class of 1983. Pat:ricia Schultheiss, Rut- 
gers University School of Law-Newark, Class of 1980; Staff 
Attorney, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. 
This Comment was begun while Ms. Schultheiss was a stu- 
dent. 
1. Eight states have community property systems: Ar- 
izona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Texas, Washington. See FAM. L. REP. (BNA) q1[ 403:i; 405:i; 
413:i; 419:i; 429:0003; 432:0002; 444:i; 448:i. 
2. 439 U.S. 572 (1979). 
3. In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 
P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977), reu'd, 439 U.S. 572 
(1979). They had been married in 1.958 and separated in 
1972. 19 Cal. 3d at 615, 566 P.2d at 225, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 
591. 
Hisquierdo was f i f t~ - th ree .~  Mr. Hisquierdo had 
been employed by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
Fe Railroad from 1942 to 1975, and thereafter by 
the Los Angeles Union Passenger Terminal.5 Both 
jobs entitled him to retirement benefits under the 
Railroad Retirement Act6 when and if he reached 
age sixty.' 
4. 19 Cal. 3d at 615, 566 P.2d at 225, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 
591. 
5. 439 U.S. at 578. 
6. The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. § 
231 (1976), set up a system of retirement and disability 
benefits for employees of the railroad industry in lieu of 
Social Security benefits. See 45 U.S.C. $ 231q. Both employ- 
ees and carriers pay a federal tax which funds the Railroad 
Retirement Account. 45 U.S.C. 231n. The Railroad Re- 
tirement Board, established by $ 231f of the Act, disburses 
benefits from the Account to eligible individuals. 45 U.S.C. 
$ 231a. The Railroad Retirement Act was first passed in 
1934, and was struck down a year later in Railroad Retire- 
ment Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). Congress 
passed similar legislation in 1935, based on its power to tax 
and spend for the general welfare. However, the Railroad 
Retirement Board was enjoined from directing the railroad 
companies to file reports or furnish the information the 
Board would need to administer the 1935 Railroad Retire- 
ment Act in Alton R.R. Co. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 16 
F. Supp. 955 (D.D.C. 1936). Subsequent to this case, exten- 
sive negotiations resulted in passage of the Railroad Retire- 
ment Act of 1937. Amended many times, it remained in 
force until superseded by the Railroad Retirement Act of 
1974. For the history of the acts, see generally D. SCHREIBER, 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT A N D  
RAILROAD UNEMPLOYMENT I SURANCE SYSTEMS (1978) [here- 
inafter cited as SCHREIBER]. 
7. 439 U.S. at 578. See Railroad Retirement Act of 
1974, 45 U.S.C. 231a (1976). The Court also pointed out 
[\Yon~cr~B HigRts Lotc; Rcj~ortcr. \'O/IIIIIC 7. h'trn~ber 4 .  SIIIIIIIIC~ 19821
1983 by \ \ '~IIICII~S Higl~ts Loto Rc/,orfcr, Rtrtgers-The Stotc Ut~iticrsify 
0085 -8269/80/0908 
Heinonline - -  7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 365 1981-1982 
366 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L A W  REPORTER [Vol. 7:365 
The trial court's interlocutory judgment 
awarded Mr. Hisquierdo the couple's house and 
its furnishings, and awarded Mrs. Hisquierdo a 
small interest in a mutual fund and an automo- 
bile. Mr. Hisquierdo was also ordered to reim- 
burse his wife for her half of the equity in their 
house, and a judicial lien in her favor was placed 
on the real e ~ t a t e . ~  However, the court refused to 
grant Mrs. ~ isquierdo  an interest in her husband's 
Railroad Retirement Act benefits, or an equiva- 
lent sum, on the ground that she had no commu- 
nity interest in those funds.Q 
Writing for a unanimous California Supreme 
Court, Justice Mosk reversed the trial courtlo and 
held that Railroad Retirement Act benefits consti- 
tute community property, divisible upon di- 
vorce." Mr. Hisquierdo appealed to the Supreme 
Court.12 Justice Blackmun, writing for a seven- 
person majority, held that the Railroad Retire- 
ment Act pre-empted California community 
property law.13 
The result of the Hisquierdo decision is that a 
non-employee spouse14 is not entitled to a commu- 
nity property interest in a Railroad Retirement 
Act pension fund partially or totally earned by an 
that Angela Hisquierdo "had been gainfully employed for 35 
years and had an expectation that upon her retirement she 
would be entitled to benefits under the Social- Security Act." 
439 U.S. at  579. Neither spouse claimed that Angela His- 
quierdo's expectation of receiving those benefits was commu- 
nity property. Id. It is likely that the facts of this case did not 
elicit the Court's sympathy. The Court recognized that the 
"burden of marital dissolution may be particularly onerous 
for a spouse who, unlike respondent, has no expectation of 
receiving his or her own social security benefits." Id. at  590. 
8. Id. at 579. 
9. Id. 
10. In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 
P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 572 
(1979). 
11. Analyzing the California Supreme Court's opinion, 
Justice Blackmun noted that the court had held that "be- 
cause the benefits would flow in part from petitioner's em- 
ployment during marriage, they were community property 
even though under federal law petitioner had no enforceable 
contract right." 439 U.S. at  580. 
12. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
435 U.S. 994 (1978), to consider whether the award of Rail- 
road Retirement Act benefits conflicted impermissibly with 
that Act under the standards laid out by the Court's Suprem- 
acy Clause cases. 439 U.S. at 581. 
13. 439 U.S. at  590-91. 
14. The term "non-employee spouse" is used throughout 
this Comment to refer to a spouse who never worked for the 
railroad industry, and thus has no direct interest in a Rail- 
road Retirement Act pension. The term "employee spouse" is 
used to designate a spouse who worked for the railroad 
industry. 
employee spouse during the marriage. The deci- 
sion will impact most severely on women, who, 
generally, tend to earn less and work more errati- 
cally than men, and are unable to acquire as great 
an interest in a pension fund as men who work.15 
This Comment will briefly discuss California's 
community property system, and the standards 
traditionally required by the Supreme Court for 
federal pre-emption of state property law. It will 
also examine the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the Railroad Retirement Act which led the 
Court to conclude that the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Cons t i tu t i~n '~  demanded fed- 
eral pre-emption in this case. It will discuss the 
Hisquierdo test for federal pre-emption, which 
the Supreme Court has since used to override state 
community property systems. Finally, it will eval- 
uate whether the case was correctly decided. 
A. California's Community Property System 
The standards which California courts use 
upon divorce to decide which assets are commu- 
nity property, and to divide that property be- 
tween the spouses, are set forth in state statutes17 
and the cases interpreting them.18 
15. See TASK FORCE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION, CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PENSION 
GAME: THE AMVIERICAN PENSION SYSTEM FROM THE VIEWPOINT 
OF THE AVERAGE WOMAN 50-56 (1979). 
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
17. CAL. CIV. CODE 4 687 (West 1954), $ 4  4800-4812, 
5100-5138 (West 1970). Section 687 defines community 
property as "property acquired by husband and wife, or 
either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate 
property of either." Section 4800 directs the court to divide 
the community property and quasi-community property of 
the parties equally. Quasi-community property is defined in 
4 4803 as property acquired by either spouse which would 
have been community property had the spouse who acquired 
it been domiciled in California at  the time. Separate prop- 
erty is defined in $9 5107 and 5108 as that "owned . . . 
before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, be- 
quest, devise, or descent." 
18. See, e . g . ,  Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247 (1859); 
Nilson v. Sarment, 153 Cal. 524, 96 P. 315 (1908). In Meyer 
v .  Kinzer, the California Supreme Court explained Califor- 
nia's community property statute: 
[The California] statute proceeds upon the theory that 
marriage, in respect to property acquired during its 
existence, is a community of which each spouse is a 
member, equally contributing by his or her industry to 
its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed 
to the property after dissolution, in case of surviving 
the other. 
12 Cal. at  251. 
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The fundamental premise underlying commu- 
nity property is that husband and wife are equal 
partners in marriage. Each is deemed to make 
equal contributions to the marital community, 
and, therefore, shares equally in its assets.19 This 
is true "irrespective of direct contributions to [the 
acquisition of property] or the condition of ti- 
tle."zO However, property owned before marriage 
or acquired separately after marriage by gift or 
devise is not community p r ~ p e r t y . ~ '  
Before considering Hisquierdo, the California 
Supreme Court had occasion to determine the ap- 
plicability of its community property statute to 
the division of pension funds and retirement pay 
upon divorce. In re Marriage of FithianZ2 upheld 
the trial court's characterization of that part of 
the husband's federal military retirement pay 
earned during the marriage as community prop- 
e r t ~ . ~ ~  The court noted that "the principle that 
retirement benefits are community property has 
been held to apply whether the source of the re- 
tirement fund lies in a state, federal, military or 
private employment r e l a t i on~h ip , "~~  and that 
treating military retirement pay as community 
property does not frustrate the congressional mili- 
tary retirement scheme.25 Military retirement pay 
represents compensation for past services, and is 
calculated solely on the basis of the number of 
years served on active duty and the rank attained 
prior to retirement; therefore, the court reasoned 
that it is divisible as commurlity property to the 
extent that the serviceperson was married while 
on active duty.2e 
In re Marriage of Brown2' dealt with the divi- 
sion upon divorce of non-vestedz8 pension rights 
19. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMU- 
NITY PROPERTY 1-3 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DEFu- 
NIAK & VAUGHN]. 
20. Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Con- 
cepts in Calijornia's Community Property System, 1849- 
1975, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976). 
21. DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 19, at 153-57. 
22. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 
(1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974), rehg  denied, 419 
U.S. 1060 (1974). 
23. Id. at 595, 517 P.2d at 450, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 370. 
24. Id. at 596, 517 P.2d at 451, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 371. 
25. Id. at 598-99, 517 P.2d at 453, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 372- 
73. 
26. Id. at 604, 517 P.2d at 456-57, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 376- 
77. 
27. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 
(1976). 
28. The California Supreme Court defined a vested pen- 
sion in In re Marriage of Brown: 
earned by the husband during his employment 
with General Telephone Company. Pension bene- 
fits are a form of deferred compensation for serv- 
ices rendered; the employee's right to such bene- 
fits is derived from the employment contract.z9 
Thus, the court held that an employee has a con- 
tractual right to pension benefits even if they are 
not yet vested.30 Since a contractual right is not a 
mere expectancy but a chose in action, a form of 
property, an employee acquires a property right 
to pension benefits when he or she begins to per- 
form the employment contracta31 The Brown de- 
cision reaffirmed the power of courts in commu- 
nity property states to divide the present value of 
pension rights between the spouses, or, if the 
value is too difficult to calculate because of the 
uncertainties of vesting, to retain jurisdiction and 
award each spouse an appropriate portion of each 
pension payment as it is made-a method of dis- 
tribution which subjects both spouses to an equal 
risk that the pension will not vest.32 
B. Standards for Federal Pre-Emption in Fam- 
ily Law Cases Involving Property 
The United States Supreme Court has generally 
recognized that domestic relations should be gov- 
erned by state, not federal, law.33 Only on rare 
occasions, when a state family law conflicted 
sharply with a federal statute, has the Supreme 
Court declared the state law pre-empted. Federal 
law pre-empts only if state law is found to do 
"major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal 
interests.34 Even where pre-einption has occurred, 
[A] pension right [is] vested if the employer cannot 
unilaterally repudiate that iight without terminating 
the employment relationship . . . . In divorce and dis- 
solution cases . . ., however, the term 'vested' has ac- 
quired a special meaning; it refers to a pension right 
which is not subject to a condition of forfeiture if the 
employment relationship terminates before retirement 
. . . [a pension] right which survives the discharge or 
voluntary termination of the employee. 
15 Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635. 
29. Id . ,  544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637. Note, 
however, that Brown concerned a pension derived from pri- 
vate employment and a private pension program. The pen- 
sion in Hisquierdo derived from a pension fund created by 
Congress. See infia text accompanying notes 89-91, discus- 
sing the non-contractual nature of the Railroad Retirement 
Act and other public pension programs. 
30. Id. at 845,544 P.2d at 565-66, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637. 
31. Id. at 845, 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637. 
32. Id. at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639. 
33. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). 
34. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). 
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the Court has limited review under the Suprem- 
acy Clause to a determination of whether Con- 
gress has "positively required by direct enact- 
ment" that state law be ~ r e - e m p t e d . ~ ~  
Several United States Supreme Court cases 
prior to Hisquierdo dealt with federal pre-emp- 
tion of state family and family-property laws.36 In 
Wetmore v .  M a ~ k o e , ~ ~  the Court held that the 
United States Bankruptcy Act3s did not pre-empt 
New York law under which alimony and child 
support included in a divorce decree are not con- 
sidered a debt, but rather a legal determination of 
duty owing from husband to wife. As such, the 
obligation to pay alimony and child support sur- 
vives an adjudgment of b a n k r ~ p t c y . ~ ~  
In McCune v .  E~sig,~O the federal homesteading 
law41 was held to pre-empt Washington's commu- 
nity property law.42 In that case, McCune (the 
husband) entered upon a homestead pursuant to 
the terms of the However, he died intestate 
35. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904). 
36. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Yiat- 
chos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 
U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); 
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); McCune v. Essig, 199 
U.S. 382 (1905); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904). 
37. 196 U.S. 68 (1904). 
38. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, $ 63, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), 
repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. $5 
101-411 (Supp. I11 1979). 
39. 196 U.S. at 76. The Court went on to say: 
The bankruptcy law should receive such an interpreta- 
tion as will effectuate its beneficent purposes and not 
make it an instrument to deprive dependent wives and 
children of the support and maintenance due them 
from the husband and father, which it has ever been 
the purpose of the law to enforce. 
Id. at  77. 
40. 199 U.S. 382 (1905). 
41. The Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862), has 
been amended many times. The current version is at 43 
U.S.C. $5  161-302 (1976). Section 2291 (Homestead Act, ch. 
127, $ 2, 14 Stat. 67 (.l866)) provides in pertinent part: 
No certificate shall be given, or pstent issued therefor, 
until the expiration of five years from the date of such 
entry; and if, at the expiration of such time, or at  any 
time within two years thereafter, the person making 
such entry, or, if he be dead, his widow; or in case of 
her death, his heirs or devisee . . . prove[s] . . . that 
he, she, or they have resided upon . . . the same 
[land] he, she, or they, . . . shall be entitled to a pat- 
ent, as in other cases provided by law. 
Section 2292 (Homestead Act, ch. 127, $ 2, 14 Stat. 67 
(1866)) provides in pertinent part: "[Iln case of the death of 
both father and mother, leaving an infant child or children 
under twenty-one years of age, the right and fee shall enure 
to the benefit of such infant child or children." 
42. 199 U.S. a t  390. 
43. Id .  at  386. See supra note 41. 
before a patent to the land was issued, and his 
widow fulfilled the statutory requirements neces- 
sary to receive a patent to the land.44 Years later, 
after the land had been conveyed to Essig, Mc- 
Cune's daughter claimed that under Washington's 
community property law, she was entitled to a 
one-half interest in the property as her father's 
heir under Washington's intestacy laws.45 The Su- 
preme Court rejected the daughter's argument; 
since the statute was clear as to whom the patent 
shall issue,46 Washington's community property 
and intestacy laws were therefore deemed to be 
~ r e - e m p t e d . ~ ~  
Washington's community property laws were 
later upheld in Poe v .  S e a b o ~ n , ~ ~  which required 
the Court to construe sections of the Revenue Act 
of 1926.49 The Act levied a tax upon the net in- 
come of every individual, but did not define what 
constituted income.50 When Mr. and Mrs. 
Seaborn each reported half of the total commu- 
nity income51 as gross income, the Internal Reve- 
nue Service determined that all of the income 
should have been reported on Mr. Seaborn's re- 
turn and consequently, that he owed additional 
taxes.52 The Supreme Court held that local prop- 
erty law controlled and that the husband and wife 
were entitled to file separate returns, each treat- 
ing half of the community income as his or her 
income.53 Local property law was deferred to, 
even though, as the Court acknowledged, the 
44. 199 U.S. at  386-87. 
45. Id .  at  387-88. 
46. The Court said: "It requires an exercise of ingenuity 
to establish uncertainty in these provisions . . . . The words 
of the statute are clear, and express who in turn shall be 
beneficiaries." Id .  at 389. 
47. Id .  
48. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 
49. I.R.C. $0 951-952 (1926). 
50. Section 953(a) defines net income as gross income, as 
defined in $ 954(a), minus deductions allowed by $ 937 and 
$955. According to the Court, the "Act goes no farther, and 
furnishes no other standard or definition of what constitutes 
an individual's income." 282 U.S. at  109. 
51. The income comprised Mr. Seaborn's salary, along 
with interest on bank deposits and on bonds. dividends, and 
profits on sales of real and personal prope;ty. 282 U.S. at 
109. 
52. Id .  
53. Id. at  118. The Court noted that the use of the word 
"of" in the statute denoted ownership, but that no broader 
significance should be given the phrase in the absence of 
fuller definition by Congress. Id .  at  109. 
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result was lack of uniformity in the incidence of 
taxation upon married people.54 
In Wksner v .  W i s ~ n e r , ~ ~  the Court found that 
California's community property law impinged 
upon the National Service Life Insurance Act of 
1940.5e The Act gave the insured the absolute 
right to designate and change the beneficiaries of 
the policy at Here, the widow, who had 
been estranged from her husband, the insured, 
sued to recover one half of the proceeds of the 
insurance policy, the beneficiaries of which were 
the insured's parents. She claimed that the policy 
was community property, and that she was there- 
fore entitled to one half of the proceeds.5s The 
Court decided that if it allowed the widow to 
vindicate her state law claim, the soldier's choice 
would be nullified, and Congress' intention frus- 
trated.59 Because Congress hacl "spoken with force 
and clarity in directing that t.he proceeds belong 
to the named beneficiary and no other,"e0 state 
law had to be pre-empted. 
Both Free v .  Blande' and Yiatchos v .  Yiatchose2 
involved conflicts between state community prop- 
erty laws and federal regulations governing 
United States Savings Bonds. In Free v.  Bland, 
the husband, using community funds, had pur- 
chased several bonds which were issued to "Mr. or 
Mrs. Free."e3 Under Treasury Department regu- 
lations, when either co-owner dies, "the survivor 
will be recognized as the sole and absolute 
owner."e4 After Mrs. Free died, a controversy de- 
veloped between her husband, who claimed that 
the Treasury regulations gave him exclusive own- 
ership of the bonds, and her son, who, as princi- 
54. Id. a t  117-18. Implicit in the Court's holding was the 
willingness to disrupt a comprehensive federal scheme in 
order to uphold community property law. 
55. 338 U.S. 655 (1950). 
56. Id. a t  661. 
57. National Service Life Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. $ 
802(g) (1940) (current version at  38 U.S.C. $ 770(a) (1976)). 
According to the Wissner Court, this section of the 1940 Act 
was controlling. 338 U.S. a t  658. It provided that the "in- 
sured shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or 
beneficiaries of the insurance, [within a designated class], 
. . . and shall . . . a t  all times have the right to change the 
beneficiary or beneficiaries. . . . " 
58. 338 U.S. a t  657-58. 
59. Id. a t  659. 
60. Id. at  658. 
61. 369 U.S. 663 (1962). 
62. 376 U.S. 306 (1964). 
63. 369 U.S. a t  664. 
64. 31 C.F.R. $ 315.61 (1959). 
pal beneficiary of his mother's will, claimed an 
interest by virtue of Texas community property 
laws.05 The Court said that Texas law had to yield 
to federal regulations, because Texas law was in 
conflict with the very purpose of the Treasury 
regulations which establish an absolute right of 
survivorship regardless of state law.ee 
In Yiatchos v .  Yiatchos, the husband purchased 
United States Savings Bonds with community 
funds which he made payable on his death to his 
brother.e7 Relying on Treasury  regulation^,^^ the 
brother, after the husband's death, sought to es- 
tablish his ownership of the bonds, while the 
widow sought to vindicate her claim by asserting 
property rights under Washington's community 
property laws.e9 The Washington Supreme Court 
held that the husband's conduct in purchasing the 
bonds was a fraud on his wife's rights and a 
breach of his fiduciary duty to manage the com- 
munity property for the benefit of the commu- 
n i t ~ . ~ O  The United States Supreme Court held that 
under the federal regulations Yiatchos' brother 
was entitled to the bonds unless the widow could 
show that the decedent had committed fraud or 
breach of trust tantamount to f r a ~ d ; ~ '  the Court 
noted that the widow could have consented to a 
gift of community property to her brother-in-law 
or to the inclusion of the bonds in that portion of 
the estate which was her husband's property.72 
While upholding the supremacy of the federal 
regulations, the Court remanded the case to per- 
mit the widow an opportunity to prove the facts 
concerning her knowledge of and participation in 
the purchase of the bonds.73 
United States v .  Y a ~ e 1 1 ~ ~  concerned a Small 
Business Administration disaster loan made to a 
Texas couple, who as security executed a chattel 
mortgage on their store's merchandise and fix- 
65. 369 U.S. a t  665. 
66. Id. a t  667-68. The Court declared: "State law which 
prohibits a married couple from taking advantage of the 
survivorship provisions of United States Savings Bonds 
merely because the purchase price is paid out of community 
property must fall under the Supremacy Clause." Id. a t  670. 
67. 376 U.S. a t  307-08. 
68. 31 C.F.R. $ 315.66 (1959). 
69. 376 U.S. a t  308. 
70. In re Yiatchos' Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 179, 182, 373 
P.2d 125, 127 (1962), modified, 376 U.S. 306 (1964). 
71. 376 U.S. a t  309. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. a t  310. 
74. 382 U.S. 341 (1966). 
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tures. After default on the loan, the government 
attempted to reach Mrs. Yazell's separate prop- 
erty. Mrs. Yazell moved for summary judgment 
on the ground that under Texas coverture law,75 
she lacked capacity to bind herself personally, un- 
less she had first obtained a court decree removing 
her disability to contract.7e Since she had not re- 
ceived such a decree, she argued that her separate 
property should be unreachable. The Court 
agreed, holding that in the absence of specific 
federal legislation, the federal interest in collect- 
ing a debt did not override Texas law.77 It  stated: 
Both theory and the precedents of this 
Court teach us solicitude for state inter- 
ests, particularly in the field of family 
and family-property arrangements. They 
should be overridden by the federal 
courts only where clear and substantial 
interests of the National Government, 
which cannot be served consistently with 
respect for such state interests, will suffer 
major damage if the state law is ap- 
plied. 
Here, the Court found that repayment of SBA 
loans did not present a federal interest sufficient 
to pre-empt state law.7e 
Thus, prior to Hisquierdo, pre-emption had 
been required in only four cases since 1904.80 In 
McCune v .  Essig and Wissner u.  Wissner, the 
Court found that the federal statutory schemes in 
question were clearly intended to pre-empt any 
state action, thus establishing a standard that 
where federal law is comprehensive, state law 
may not intervene. In Free v .  Bland and Yiatchos 
v .  Yiatchos, the standard articulated was less rig- 
orous. There, the Court defined the issue in terms 
of a conflict between a federal statute and a state 
law, and held that when such conflict occurs, 
state law must yield. 
75. At the time of the loan, Texas law provided that a 
married woman could not bind her separate property unless 
she had first obtained a court decree removing her disability 
to contract. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4626 (Vernon 
1925). 
76. 382 U.S. at 346-47. 
77. Id. at 352. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 353. 
80. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. 
Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 
655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905). 
In two cases where state property laws were 
upheld,a1 the Court found the wording of the fed- 
eral statutes to be unclear and ambiguous. United 
States v .  Yazell articulated a test for pre-emption: 
where Congress has spoken with clarity and en- 
acted specific provisions, and "major damage" 
would be done to "clear and substantial" federal 
interests, pre-emption must occur.82 
The United States Supreme Court in His- 
quierdo u. Hisquierdo reversed a California Su- 
preme Court decision holding that federal Rail- 
road Retirement Act benefits were subject to 
community property distribution upon the disso- 
lution of a marriage.83 The Court held that the 
purpose of the Act, to assure employees that pen- 
sions would be available to them upon retirement, 
together with the statutory scheme itself, man- 
dated that California community property law be 
pre-empted by the federal act under the authority 
of the Supremacy Clause.84 
While the Court recognized that marriage was 
within the temporal control of the states,85 it re- 
lied upon its decisions in McCune v .  Essig, 
Wissner v .  Wissner, Free v .  Bland, and Yiatchos 
v .  Yiatchos to hold that state community property 
law 'must be pre-empted because of the substan- 
tial damage which would otherwise be done.8e 
The Court found Hisquierdo to be analogous to 
those four cases because it too presented a conflict 
between federal and state rules regarding alloca- 
tion of a federal entitlement. The Court reasoned 
that because compulsory federal taxes finance 
railroad retirement benefits, the benefits closely 
parallel the land homesteaded in McCune. In ad- 
dition, the Court found that the provisions of the 
Railroad Retirement Act protecting a beneficiary 
against attachment and anticipation were similar 
to the statutory scheme at issue in ' ~ i s s n e r . ~ ~  
The Court described the Act as resembling both 
a private pension plan and a social welfare plan 
by creating two tiers of benefits: the upper tier of 
81. Poe v.  Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Wetmore v. 
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904). 
82. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). 
83. 439 U.S. 572, 590-91 (1979). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 581. 
86. Id. at 581-83. 
87. Id. at 582-83. 
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benefits resembles a private pension plan because 
of the correlation between benefits paid and an 
employee's career service and earnings; the lower 
tier of benefits corresponds exactly to those the 
employee would expect to receive were he or she 
covered by the Social Security Further- 
more, the Railroad Retirement Act provides for a 
worker's spouse to receive individual benefits 
which terminate if the spouse and the employee 
are absolutely divorced.89 Also, the Court found 
that Railroad Retirement Act benefits, unlike So- 
cial Security benefits, are not contractual in na- 
ture. Congress may alter or terminate them as it 
sees fit.e0 This was so even though the Railroad 
Retirement Act, unlike the Social Security Act, 
does not explicitly reserve to Congress the right to 
"alter, amend, or repeal any provision" of the 
Act.91 
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun 
found that Congress, in enacting section 231m of 
the Act, setting forth a flat prohibition against 
attachment and a n t i c i p a t i ~ n , ~ ~  meant to ensure 
that Railroad Retirement Act benefits actually 
reach the beneficiary. To the Court, section 231m 
represents a clear choice by Congress to protect 
the benefits from legal process. Under the stand- 
ards articulated by the Court, such a congressio- 
nal policy must pre-empt all state law with which 
it  conflict^.^^ Therefore, because Congress made 
88. Id. at  574-75. 
89. Id. at 575. 
90. Id. 
91. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 8 1304 (1976). The 
Court found that this right was reserved to Congress because 
the Railroad Retirement Act indirectly incorporated this lan- 
guage from the Social Security Act, and because the mini- 
mum benefit is the same as would have been received under 
the Social Security Act. See 45 U.S.C. 8 231b(a)(l) (1976). 
92. 439 U.S. at  576. The Railroad Retirement Act of 
1974, 45 U.S.C. 8 231m (1976), provides: 
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, 
or of any State, territory, or the District of Columbia, 
no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assignable 
or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attach- 
ment, or other legal process under any circumstances 
whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be antici- 
pated . . . . 
The Court noted that this section was added in 1955 to make 
"it clear that the railroad retirement and unemployment 
benefits are still exempt from Federal or State taxation, gar- 
nishment and attachment, a clarification made necessary by 
an inadvertent oversight in last year's new tax law and 
doubts raised in several States." 101 CONG. REC. 11,772 
(1955), cited at 439 U.S. 572, 584 n.17 (1979). 
93. 439 U.S. at  584. 
no exception for a non-employee spouse with a 
community property award, the non-employee 
spouse was not permitted to reach the benefits to 
vindicate such an award.94 In fact, the Court rea- 
soned that the creation of a separate annuity for 
non-employee spouses which terminates upon ab- 
solute divorcee5 indicated congressional intent 
that the employee's retirement benefits would be- 
long solely to the employee.ee Therefore, it held 
that a non-employee spouse is not entitled to any 
portion of an employee spouse's annuity. 
The Court also looked to the legislative history 
of the Act to glean congressional intentae7 During 
revision of the Railroad Retirement Act in 1974, it 
was proposed that a divorced spouse receive a 
94. Id. at 585. 
95. 45 U.S.C. 8 231d(c)(3) (1976). 
96. 439 U.S. at 584. 
97. The Act entitles railroad industry employees to an 
annuity if they meet the criteria specified in 8 231a: 
(a)( l)  The following-described individuals, if they 
shall have com~le ted  ten vears of service and shall 
have filed application for annuities, shall, subject to 
the conditions set forth in subsections (e), (f), and (h) 
of this section, be entitled to annuities in the amounts 
provided under section 231b of this title- 
(i) individuals who have attained the age of sixty- 
five; 
(ii) individuals who have attained the age of sixty 
and have completed thirty years of service; 
(iii) individuals who have attained the age of sixty- 
two and have completed less than thirty years of serv- 
ice, but the annuity of such individuals shall be re- 
duced by 11180 for each calendar month that he or she 
is under age sixty-five when the annuity begins to 
accrue; 
(iv) individuals who have a current connection with 
the railroad industry, whose permanent physical or 
mental condition is such as to be disabling for work in 
their regular occupation, and who (A) have completed 
twenty years of service or (B) have attained the age of 
sixty; and 
(v) individuals whose permanent physical or mental 
condition is such that they are unable to engage in any 
regular employment. 
Its sponsors felt that the Act would encourage older workers 
to retire by providing them with the means "to enjoy the 
closing days of their lives with peace of mind and physical 
comfort," and so would "assure more rapid advancement in 
the service" and also more jobs for younger workers. H.R. 
REP. NO. 1711, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), cited at 439 
U.S. at 573-74. Lee M.  Eddy, Vice President, Order of 
Railroad Telegraphers, testified in favor of the original bill. 
He was concerned about certain defects in the railroads' 
private pension plans. See SCHREIBER, supra note 6, at  4. 
Eddy felt that the Act would provide railroad employees 
with the assurance that when they reached retirement age, a 
fund would exist from which their annuities would be paid 
which was not subject to discontinuance through the unilat- 
eral action of the employer. SCHREIBER, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
Heinonline - -  7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 371 1981-1982 
372 W O M E N ' S  RIGHTS L A W  R E P O R T E R  [Vol. 7:365 
separate benefit similar to that received by a di- 
vorced spouse under the Social Security Act.98 
This proposal was rejected by the labor-manage- 
ment negotiation committee and later by Con- 
gress, because of the precarious financial condi- 
tion of the Railroad Retirement A c c o ~ n t . ~ ~  The 
Court interpreted this as a careful and deliberate 
decision by Congress to award the annuity to the 
employee spouse alone.'OO Furthermore, Con- 
gress's objective of encouraging older employees 
to retire would be frustrated by automatic reduc- 
tions in the amount of the annuity the employee 
spouse  receive^.'^' Thus the Court rejected Angela 
Hisquierdo's contentions that Congress could not 
have intended the harsh result which left her 
without compensation for her contributions to the 
marital community, and that section 231m 
merely "restate[s] the Government's sovereign im- 
munity from burdensome garnishment suits."102 
In support of its holding that a non-employee 
spouse cannot reach an employee spouse's benefits 
for a community property settlement, the Court 
relied heavily on the fact that Congress had re- 
cently codified a distinction between alimony and 
support awards on the one hand, and community 
property awards on the other, in amendments to 
the Social Security Act. The Court found that 
these amendments expressly override section 
231m and allow garnishment for alimony, spousal 
support and child support claims; they also pro- 
vide that for the purposes of the amendments, 
"alimony" does not include community property 
settlements.lo3 The Court determined that at least 
98. 439 U.S. at  585. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 
$4 402(b), 416(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
99. 439 U.S. at 585 & n.18. 
100. Id. at 585. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at  585-86. 
103. 42 U.S.C. $659 (1976) and 42 U.S.C. 4 662 (Supp. I 
1977). Section 659 provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effec- 
tive January 1, 1975, moneys (the entitlement to 
which is based upon remuneration for employment) 
due from, or payable by, the United States . . . to an 
individual, including members of the armed services, 
shall be subject, in like manner and to the same extent 
as if the United States were a private person, to legal 
process brought for the enforcement, against such in- 
dividual of his legal obligations to provide child sup- 
port or make alimony payments. 
After passage of $ 659, confusion arose in the lower courts as 
to whether community property was included within the 
definition of "alimony." As a result, in 1977 Congress added 
a definitional amendment, $ 662, which stipulated that for 
part of the reason for enacting the amendments 
was to save the Government money through re- 
ductions in Aid to Families with Dependent Chil- 
dren (AFDC) payments brought about by the 
ability of neglected spouses and children to gar- 
nish money directly from the Government.lo4 The 
Court went on to state that it was "therefore logi- 
cal to conclude that Congress, in adopting [sec- 
tion 662(c)], thought that a family's need for sup- 
port could justify garnishment, even though it 
deflected other federal benefit programs from 
their intended goals, but that community prop- 
erty claims, which are not based on need, could 
not do so." lo5 
The Court rejected Angela Hisquierdo's conten- 
tion that she could leave the benefit scheme intact 
by receiving an offsetting award taken out of 
other currently available community assets.'0e 
The Court determined that this remedy suffered 
from the same infirmities as did attachment.lo7 In 
purposes of $ 659, "alimony" did not include community 
property settlements. 439 U.S. at  587, n.20. Section 662(c) 
provides: 
The term 'alimony', when used in reference to the 
legal obligations of an individual to provide the same, 
means periodic payments of funds for the support and 
maintenance of the spouse (or former spouse) of such 
individual, and (subject to and in accordance with 
State law) includes but is not limited to, separate 
maintenance, alimony pendente lite, maintenance, 
and spousal support; such term also includes attorney's 
fees, interest, and court costs when and to the extent 
that the same are expressly made recoverable as such 
pursuant to a decree, order, or judgment issued in 
accordance with applicable State law by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. Such term does not include 
any payment or transfer of property or its value by an 
individual to his spouse or former spouse in compli- 
ance with any community property settlement, equita- 
ble distribution of property, or other division of prop- 
erty between spouses or former spouses. 
See itlfra text accompanying notes 170-74. 
104. 123 CONG. REC. 9,015 (1977). Senator Nunn intro- 
duced and explained the 1977 amendments. In doing so, he 
discussed the savings to the federal government over the 
preceding two years which he expected to continue due to 
garnishment. 
105. 439 U.S. at 587. See also infra notes 175-76 and 
accompanying text. 
106. 439 U.S. at  588. Angela Hisquierdo sought a reme- 
dial offset under the authority of In re Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 
129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert. den . ,  
421 U.S. 976 (1975). This case which applied California 
community property law to military retirement benefits was 
reopened and reversed after Hisquierdo. Rev'd, 97 Cal. App. 
3d 41, 158 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1979). 
107. 439 U.S. at  588. That is, the Court felt that the 
statutory scheme would be upset and the employee spouse's 
economic security jeopardized, as it would be from a regu- 
lar, periodic deduction from the benefits themselves. 
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addition, the section 231m prohibition against an- 
ticipation prevented Mrs. Hisquierdo from seek- 
ing an offsetting award. lo8 The Court stated three 
reasons why an offsetting award would frustrate 
the anti-anticipation provision. First, it would al- 
low Mrs. Hisquierdo to receive her interest in 
advance of the date Congress had set for interest 
to accrue.log Second, the uncertainties surround- 
ing the payment of benefits and the amount 
thereof could make a lump sum award unfair."O 
Third, because Congress has the right to alter the 
terms of the Act, any lump sun1 offset would frus- 
trate congressional ability to do so without unduly 
penalizing future recipients of the benefits."' 
In his dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice 
Rehnquist,l12 attacked the majority's opinion. He 
found "nothing in the Act to suggest that Congress 
meant to insulate these pension benefits from the 
rules of ownership that in California are a normal 
incident of marriage."l13 Noting that Congress or- 
dinarily acts "against the background of the total 
108. Id. Provisions which create a restraint on anticipa- 
tion usually arise within the context of spendthrift trusts. A 
spendthrift trust is created to provide a fund for the mainte- 
nance of the beneficiary, and at  the same time to secure it 
against his or her improvidence or incapacity. BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1256 (5th ed. 1979). A leading commentator on 
spendthrift trusts has defined the restraint on anticipation as 
an instruction that the "interest of a sc~le beneficiary shall not 
be paid to him before a certain date." E.  GRISWOLD, SPEND- 
THRIFT TRUSTS $ 512 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as 
CHISWOLD]. 
109. 439 U.S. at  589. The Court noted that in Hetrick v. 
Reading Co., 39 F. Supp. 22 (D.N. J. 1941), "the prohibition 
against anticipation was applied in this sense. The court held 
that a defendant employer could not offset a tort claim by 
the amount the plaintiff expected to receive in Railroad 
Retirement Act disability benefits." Id. at 588 n.22. But see 
infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. 
110. 439 U.S. at  589. The Court stated that the unfairness 
could arise in a number of ways. If the employee spouse died 
before collecting any benefits, his or her beneficiary could 
suffer if the lump sum award of cominunity property to the 
non-employee spouse exceeded the lump sum death benefits 
provided for in $ 231e of the Act. Also, if the employee left 
the railroad industry before retirement, he or she might lose 
certain supplemental benefits provided for in 5 231a(b)(iv). 
Another possibility is that Congress could alter the terms of 
the Act to the detriment of the emplc~yee spouse. Id. 
111. Id. at  589-90. 
112. At the time Hisquierdo was decided, Justice Rehn- 
quist was the only member of the Supreme Court who had 
practiced law in a community property state (California and 
Arizona). It is logical to infer, therefore, that he was more 
familiar than were his colleagues with the law as it relates to 
community property. 
113. Id. at  591 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
corpus juris of the states,"l14 the dissent empha- 
sized the importance of an accurate understand- 
ing of the state substantive law in the area where 
pre-emption is ~ l a i m e d . " ~  He dismissed the ma- 
jority's suggestion that a community property set- 
tlement was a benefit for a divorced spouse.lle 
Justice Stewart pointed out that a "community 
property settlement merely distributes to the 
spouses [sic] property which . . . he or she already 
owns,"l17 and that the California Supreme Court 
had decided to treat pension benefits as property 
even though such benefits were not formally 
vested.'18 
Justice Stewart emphasized the high standards 
necessary for federal pre-emption in the area of 
family property law,"9 and distinguished those 
cases relied upon by the majoritylZ0 which held 
that federal law pre-empted the state community 
property law in question.12' He asserted that the 
finding of pre-emption in Wissner and Bland was 
based on "explicit provisions of federal law 
[which] not only conflicted with principles of 
state law but also created property rights at vari- 
ance with the rights that normally would have 
been created by local property law."122 The Rail- 
road Retirement Act, he pointed out, contained 
no express provisions governing the ownership 
rights that might attach to the pension interest of 
a married employee.lZ3 
Justice Stewart attacked the Court's conclusion 
that Congress intended to pre-empt state commu- 
nity property law by titling the benefit in the 
114. Id., citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 
U.S. 63, 68 (1966), which cited H. HART & H. WECHSLER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTD~VI 435 (1953). 
115. Id. at 592, citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 
644 (1971); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). In Merrill Lynch, the Court 
discussed the standards for federal pre-emption: "Our analy- 
sis is also to be tempered by the conviction that the proper 
approach is to reconcile 'the operation of both statutory 
schemes with one another rather than holding one com- 
pletely ousted.' " 414 U.S. at  127; see also Silver v. New York 
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). 
116. 439 U.S. at  592 (Stewart, J . ,  dissenting). See supra 
text accompanying notes 19-21. 
117.' 439 U.S. at 593. 
118. Id. at  594. 
119. Id. at  594-95. See supra text accompanying notes 33- 
35. 
120. Id. at  595-96. See cases cited supra note 80. 
121. 439 U.S. at 595-96. 
122. Id. at  596. 
123. Id. at 597. 
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employee spouse and providing a separate annuity 
for the non-employee spouse.lZ4 He conceded that 
the anti-attachment provision, section 231m, was 
the only provision of the Act which might argua- 
bly conflict with California community property 
law.lZ5 But, Justice Stewart reasoned, such provi- 
sions are generally designed to prevent creditors 
from reaching the benefits; under community 
property law, spouses are co-owners, not creditors 
of each other.lZe Upon dissolution of the mar- 
riage, "the community property is divided, not 
adjudicated as indebtedness."lZ7 Furthermore, he 
considered the prohibition against garnishment 
and attachment inapplicable here because those 
"terms govern remedies, not ownership rights, 
and the remedies themselves traditionally have 
been unavailable in an action grounded upon the 
theory that the property at issue 'belongs' to the 
claimant."128 Justice Stewart also noted that be- 
cause the Hisquierdos lived in a community prop- 
erty state, the pension as property belonged to 
both spouses. Because division of the property be- 
tween co-owners should not be interpreted as an 
"assignment," the section 231m prohibition 
against assignment should be inapplicable in com- 
munity property states.12@ 
Justice Stewart found the majority's reliance on 
the prohibition against anticipation as unpersua- 
sive as its other arguments.130 At common law, 
. Justice Stewart explained, the restraint against 
anticipation was used to prevent creditors from 
124. Id. at  597-98. 
125. Id. at  598. 
126. Id. at  599. The question of whether a former spouse 
is a creditor has also been considered in the context of 
ERISA. Virtually every court which has considered the issue 
has held that under ERISA a former spouse is not a creditor 
and may levy against the spouse's pension to enforce a sup- 
port obligation. See Operating Engineers Local 488 Pension 
Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981), which 
cites cases from several jurisdictions in support. The ratio- 
nale for these decisions is protection of dependents and the 
state's interest in enforcins support agreements. ERISA's 
anti-assignment and alienation provisions were included 
only "to protect a person and those dependent on him from 
the claims of creditors, not to insulate a breadwinner from 
the valid support claims of spouse and offspring." Mallory v. 
Mallory, 179 N.J. Super. 556, 559 (Ch. Div. 1981) '(citing 
Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). 
127. 439 U.S. at  599. 
128. Id. See generally J .  ROOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF GARNISHMENT (1896); S. KNEELAND, LAW OF ATTACH- 
MENTS (1885). 
129. 439 U.S. at  599-600. 
130. Id. at  600. 
compelling the trustees of a fund to make lump 
sum payments before they came due.131 He dis- 
agreed with the Court's conclusion that by consid- 
ering the pension fund in making a community 
property settlement, a judge was anticipating the 
payment of the benefits.132 Justice Stewart also 
attacked the majority's suggestion that the prohi- 
bition against anticipation "was designed to pre- 
serve congressional 'freedom to amend the 
Act.' He was not persuaded by the majority's 
reasoning that Congress was free to amend the 
Railroad Retirement Act because it contained no 
explicit provision which reserved this power to 
C 0 n g r e ~ s . l ~ ~  Justice Stewart concluded that the 
legislative history, in fact, suggested that the op- 
posite was true.135 
IV. EVALUATION 
Confronted with an ambiguous statute, and no- 
tions of federalism which require that "major 
damage" be done to "clear and substantial" fed- 
eral interests before the Supremacy Clause re- 
quires that state community property law be over- 
ridden,130 the Hisquierdo Court should have 
decided the case on the basis of California com- 
munity property law. 
The four cases137 relied on as precedent for fed- 
eral pre-emption of state community property 
law 138 are distinguishable from Hisquierdo . In 
each case, the relevant statute created either clear 
and explicit conflicts with the state community 
property law in question, or impinged upon a 
comprehensive federal scheme.139 But the statu- 
tory provisions in Hisquierdo were not clearly in 
131. Id. at 601. See also GRISWOLD, supra note 108. 
132. 439 U.S. at 601. 
133. Id. at  602. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. Justice Stewart pointed out that the legislative 
history suggests that the Act was passed to provide security 
for railroad industry employees whose benefits under private 
pension plans had often been considered discretionary. The 
Act's drafters wanted to guarantee workers an absolute right 
to their pensions. Therefore, the anti-attachment provision 
did not relate to Congress' possible termination or reduction 
of Railroad Retirement Act pensions. H.R. REP. NO. 1711, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1935). 
136. 439 U.S. at  581. U.S. v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 
(1966). 
137. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. 
Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 
655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905). 
138. See 439 U.S. at 582-83. 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47, 55-73. 
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conflict with state property law; nor was the ben- 
efits scheme so comprehensive as to override local 
law. Thus, pre-emption should not have oc- 
curred. As Justice Stewart said, "In the Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1974 Congress did not with 
'force and clarity' direct that the employee's pen- 
sion benefits should not be subject to the substan- 
tive community property law of C a l i f ~ r n i a . " ' ~ ~  
In Hisquierdo, the Court relied on certain as- 
pects of the Railroad Retirement Act141 to support 
its holding that it was in clear conflict with state 
community property law arid therefore pre- 
empted the state law.142 Initially, the Court exam- 
ined the legislative history and purposes of the 
It  concluded that the Act was intended to 
implement the federal policy of providing greater 
economic security to retiring railroad industry 
employees, thereby encouraging older workers to 
retire.144 But this articulation of federal policy by 
the Court merely restated the obvious: that pen- 
sions are intended to provide a retirement income 
to employees. 145 This policy is not so compelling as 
to justify pre-empting state substantive domestic 
property law. 
The Court also determined that Railroad Re- 
tirement Act benefits were not contractual inas- 
much as Congress had reserved the power to alter 
or terminate them at any time.'47 This reservation 
of power by Congress is not express, however; 
rather, it was inferred by analogy from the Social 
Security Act, where an express reservation of 
power appears.148 The Court's presumptions 
about and interpretation of the contractual nature 
of Railroad Retirement Act benefits seem illogi- 
The Court's conclusion that the benefits are not 
contractual is also inconsistent with the legislative 
history and purposes of the Act as interpreted by 
the majority itself.151 The purposes of the Act indi- 
cate that a beneficiary of this federal pension plan 
acquires at least some contractual right to the 
benefits. Retention of the power to terminate is 
contrary to Congress' concern for railroad em- 
ployees' financial security and peace of mind.152 
However, even if the benefits are, in fact, non- 
contractual, California would still be free to treat 
the employee spouse's interest therein as commu- 
nity property.Is3 AS the dissent notes, if a state is 
free to treat even a non-vested expectancy interest 
as property,154 then that characterization should 
stand unless the state property law conflicts in 
other ways with federal policies and laws. 
The Court's finding that section 231d(c)(3) of 
the Railroad Retirement Act, creating a separate 
annuity for non-employee spouses, indicated a 
congressional intent to designate the Act's retire- 
ment benefits to the employee spouse alone, is also 
questionable.'55 The Court concluded that to al- 
low the non-employee spouse to appropriate a 
portion of the employee spouse's benefits would 
deprive the employee of a congressional entitle- 
ment to benefits.156 The Court thus imputed a 
meaning to section 231d(c)(3) which is stated no- 
where in the Act itself. This interpretation results 
from a strained reading of a section of the Act 
which has nothing to do with the property rights 
of divorcing spouses in the pension fund.157 
cal. It is logica1 assume that because Con- exclusio alterius." Mention of one thing implies exclusion of 
gress made an explicit statement in the Social Se- another. If something is expressed in one statute and not in 
- 
curity ACt,14g it-WOUld have made a similarly another, the exclusion in the seiond is deliberate. 
explicit statement in the Railroad Retirement Act 151. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. 152. See 439 U.S. at  602 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice 
had it intended to reserve the Power to amend or Stewart pointed out that legislative history suggests that the 
repeal at will. 150 
140. 439 U.S. at  597. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 84-1 11. 
142. 439 U.S. at 590. 
143. Id. at 584-85. See supra notes 97-1 11 and accompa- 
nying text. 
144. 439 U.S. at  584-85. 
145. Id. at 590. 
146. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 33-81. 
147. 439 U.S. at  575 n.6. 
148. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 90-91. 
149. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 1304 (1976). 
150. This interpretation of the two acts is consistent with 
the maxim of statutory construction: "Expressio unius est 
 ailr road-~etirement Act was intended to provide security to 
workers whose pension benefits under private plans were 
often at the em<loyer's discretion. 
153. Id. at 591. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) 
(affirming the principle that the Supreme Court will not 
review judgments of state courts which rest on adequate and 
independent grounds). Justice Stewart noted that since Cali- 
fornia courts routinely deal with problems in assessing the 
value of community property, difficulties in assessment can- 
not provide a basis for federal pre-emption. 439 U.S. at 603 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The same observation applies to 
courts in any community property state. 
154. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
155. 439 U.S. at  584-85. 
156. Id. 
157. The plain language of $ 231d(c)(3) does not support 
the Court's interpretation: "The entitlement of a spouse of 
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Congress' decision not to award a divorced 
spouse a separate annuity was interpreted by the 
Court as a deliberate decision to award the retire- 
ment annuity to the employee spouse alone.lS8 
The Court, however, contradicted itself in an at- 
tempt to justify this conclusion. The Court first 
stated that the Railroad Retirement Act embodied 
a community concept by providing a separate 
benefit for a spouse.159 But in the same para- 
graph, the Court stated that the decision not to 
provide a benefit to a divorced spouse was a delib- 
erate rejection of community property princi- 
ples.leO This conclusion was undermined by the 
Court's own recognition of the precarious finan- 
cial condition of the Railroad Retirement Ac- 
count.lel Thus, the Court itself acknowledged 
that the divorced non-employee spouse is deprived 
of benefits not because Congress rejected the com- 
munity concept, but because Congress deter- 
mined that there were not sufficient funds avail- 
able to continue such,benefits. In fact, it is logical 
to suppose that Congress terminated the separate 
award upon absolute divorce because it assumed 
that the non-employee spouse could vindicate his 
or her claim through community property law.le2 
The Court relied heavily upon the language of 
section 231m which protects the benefits from 
legal process "notwithstanding any other law . . . 
of any State" to argue that such benefits are pro- 
tected from state community property law. le3 The 
Court buttressed this argument by asserting that 
"[elven state tax-collection laws must bow to its 
command."le4 It is clear, however, that Congress 
added the clause to ensure that neither federal nor 
state tax collectors would be able to encroach on 
the distribution of benefits, not to prevent 
spouses, who are co-owners in community prop- 
erty states, from vindicating their ownership 
rights. le5 
an individual to an annuity under section 231a(c) of this title 
shall end on the last day of the month preceding the month 
in which (A) the spouse or the individual dies, (B) the spouse 
and the individual are absolutely divorced. . . ." 
158. 439 U.S. at 584-85. 
159. Id. at 584. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 585. 
162. See In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 
618, 566 P.2d 224, 227, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590, 593 (1977), 
reu'd, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). See 439 U.S. at 586, where the 
Court disposes of such a claim by Angela Hisquierdo. 
163. 439 U.S. at 585. 
164. Id. at 584. 
165. Id. See supra note 92. 
The Court also asserted that a non-employee 
spouse could not be the co-owner of an interest 
which the employee spouse does not yet own.lee 
But our federalist system gives the states the right 
to create substantive property rights even in mere 
expectancies.le7 The Court ignored this state 
right. 
Section 231m was intended to protect benefits 
from creditors, and should not be used to prevent 
a co-owner from vindicating his or her ownership 
rights. A non-employee spouse is not a creditor of 
the employee spouse; nor does he or she receive a 
"benefit" by acquiring an interest in a pension 
fund through a community property settle- 
ment.le8 The non-employee spouse merely re- 
ceives that proportion of the benefits attributable 
to his or her contributions to the marital commu- 
nity.le9 
The Court stressed the fact that Congress had 
codified a distinction between alimony and sup- 
port awards on the one hand, and community 
property awards on the other, when it passed 
certain amendments to the Social Security Act.170 
Those amendments permitted garnishment of fed- 
eral benefits for alimony, spousal and child sup- 
port claims, but explicitly defined alimony so as to 
exclude community property  settlement^.'^' An 
examination of several lower court cases172 indi- 
cates that the amendments were a response to 
disagreement over whether the United States 
Government was amenable to legal process and 
garnishment proceedings for community property 
~ett1ements.l'~ The cases did not question the right 
166. 439 U.S. at 589-90. 
167. Id. at 591 (Stewart, J.,  dissenting). See supra text 
accompanying note 153. 
168. 439 U.S. at 593-94 (Stewart, J . ,  dissenting). 
169. Id. at 593. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21. 
170. 439 U.S. at 587. See 42 U.S.C. 5s 659, 662(c) (Supp. 
IV  1980). 
171. 42 U.S.C. $5  659, 662(c) (Supp. IV 1980). See 439 
U.S. at 576-77. 
172. Marin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1977); 
Kelley v. Kelley, 425 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. La. 1977); Wil- 
liams v. Williams, 338 So.2d 869 (Fla. App. 1976); United 
States v. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), 
reu'd, 567 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1978). 
173. United States u.  Stelter, 553 S. W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1977), reu'd, 567 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1978) involved an 
ex-wife who instituted garnishment proceedings against the 
United States to recover a portion of her former husband's 
military retirement pay awarded her in a divorce decree. 
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that Dorothy Stelter 
could garnish the United States. On appeal, the Texas Su- 
preme Court reversed on the ground that the United States 
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of the non-employee spouse to sue the employee 
spouse for a portion of the benefits pursuant to a 
community property award, and no explicit 
showing of an intent to prohibit such suits was 
made. Thus, the conclusion that Congress in- 
tended by these amendments to cut off the right of 
a non-employee spouse to pension benefits for a 
community property settlement is attenuated at 
best, particularly without a more explicit showing 
of intent. 174 
A more logical interpretation of sections 659 
and 662(c) is that they concern only the United 
States Government's amenability to legal process 
for garnishment of moneys payable by it to the 
had not consented to be sued in a garnishment proceeding to 
vindicate community property claims. Note that Texas does 
not allow permanent alimony. TEX. I ~ A M .  CODE ANN. Q 3.59 
(Vernon Supp. 1982). In Williams v. Williams, 338 So.2d 
869 (Fla. App. 1976), a divorced husband complained of an 
order for writ of garnishment subjecting his United States 
retirement benefits to a payment tc~ his former wife. The 
court held that liquidated arrearages due Katharina Wil- 
liams under a Texas divorce decree csould be considered ali- 
mony for purposes of Q 659, and so were amenable to gar- 
nishment. Marin v .  Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1977), 
arose when an ex-husband refused to pay his former wife 
that portion of his military retirement: benefits granted her in 
a Texas divorce decree; the former wife sought to garnish the 
United States. The court acknowledged that the United 
States has by statute waived immunity for enforcement of 
alimony obligations, but denied the wife alimony on other 
grounds. Military retirement benefits were also at  stake in 
Kelley v .  Kelley, 425 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. La. 1977), in 
which a former wife sued her ex-husband and the United 
States. The court held that the statute giving consent for the 
United States to be sued did not apply where the plaintiff 
was making a claim for community property, not child sup- 
port or alimony. 
174. The legislative history of Q 662(c), the definitional 
amendment, indicates that it was enacted merely to alleviate 
confusion in the lower courts. Simply, the federal govern- 
ment's immunity to garnishment suits involving community 
property awards was affirmed. See supra note 104, and 439 
U.S. a t  599-600 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Congress de- 
cided to waive the federal governmerit's sovereign immunity 
to legal process for alimony and child support claims after 
concluding that to do so would alleviate potential and actual 
welfare payments to neglected spouses and children. 439 
U.S. at  587 11.20. See supra text aocompanying note 105. 
Although alimony is not always tied to need, many recipi- 
ents of welfare and AFDC could be removed from the public 
assistance rolls if there were a mechanism through which 
existing support obligations could be enforced. 439 U.S. at 
587. Community property settlements may satisfy the same 
goal, but need is not usually a factor when a community 
property settlement is made. 439 U.S. at 587. When Con- 
gress excluded community property from the definition of 
alimony, it may have been limiting the cases in which the 
federal government would be amenable to legal process to 
those which were most urgent. 
employee spouse.175 The restrictive definition of 
alimony, limiting it to its common law meaning 
of spousal support exclusive of community prop- 
erty settlements, was probably used only to pro- 
tect the government from burdensome garnish- 
ment suits for community property.17e 
Throughout its discussion of garnishment for 
alimony awards, the Court proceeded on the as- 
sumption that only those in dire need are awarded 
a1im0ny.I~~ In fact, need is only one of the reasons 
why al-imony may be awarded.178 The Court as- 
sumed that needy persons in community property 
states would be awarded alimony and would be 
able to garnish benefits to satisfy the alimony 
award.179 This assumption ignores the reality that 
alimony is not awarded where there is an inability 
to pay.lBO It  also ignores one state's laws. Texas 
does not allow permanent alimony; lB1 the only 
way for a non-employee spouse in Texas to have 
any income is to demonstrate his or her commu- 
nity interest in a pension acquired during the 
marriage. 
The Hisquie~do Court pieced together a make- 
shift interpretation of the Railroad Retirement 
Act requiring pre-emption of California commu- 
nity property law. Summarizing the inadequacies 
in the majority's reasoning, the dissent wrote: 
From the Court's own review of the Rail- 
road Retirement Act, it is apparent . . . 
that the asserted federal conflict with 
California community property laws- 
far from being grounded upon the con- 
crete expressions that ordinarily are re- 
quired to support a finding of federal 
pre-emption . . . is patched together 
from statutory provisions that have no 
175. See supra note 104. 
176. See 439 U.S. at 599-600 n.4 (Stewart, J . ,  dissenting). 
177. 439 U.S. at  587. 
178. Factors taken into account by courts when awarding 
alimony include: the payor spouse's ability to pay; the recipi- 
ent spouse's needs; the fault of the parties; the parties' ages 
and health; the duration of the marriage; the couple's stand- 
ard of living; what one party gave up when he or she mar- 
ried the other; the property of the parties, and the parties' 
respective contributions to its accumulation; the parties' 
other financial responsibilities. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DO- 
MESTIC RELATIONS I N THE UNITED STATES 441-47 (1968). 
179. 439 U.S. at  590. 
180. See supra note 178. 
181. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. Q 3.59 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
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relationship at all to substantive property 
rights. Indeed, the federal 'policies' the 
Court perceives amount to little more 
than the commonplace that retirement 
benefits are designed to provide an in- 
come on retirement to the employee. 
There is simply nothing in the Act to 
suggest that Congress meant to insulate 
these pension benefits from the rules of 
ownership that in California are a nor- 
mal incident of marriage. '" 
Confronted with this lack of clear conflict or com- 
prehensive scheme, the Court should have 
adopted a statutory interpretation which left the 
state law intact. 
The Court in Hisquierdo articulated the test 
traditionally used in pre-emption cases stating 
that state family law has had to yield when "Con- 
gress has 'positively required by direct enactment' 
that state law be pre-empted,"lB3 and that pre- 
emption is mandated when "the right as asserted 
conflicts with the express terms of federal law and 
. . . its consequences sufficiently injure the objec- 
tives of the federal program to require nonrecog- 
nition."lg4 Yet the Court did not apply this test for 
pre-emption to the federal program at issue. The 
Railroad Retirement Act's terms requiring disposi- 
tion of benefits upon divorce are neither express 
nor direct.lB5 Moreover, the division of pension 
benefits under California community property 
law would not have disrupted the federal statu- 
tory s ~ h e m e . " ~  
Despite this weakness, the Court relied on His- 
quierdo in two significant 1981 decisions: Mc- 
Carty u. McCartyls7 and Ridgway u. R i d g ~ a y . ' ~ '  
In McCarty, the Court held that federal law pre- 
cluded California courts from dividing military 
retirement pay pursuant to state community 
property law. The Court reasoned that Califor- 
nia's application of community property concepts 
to military retirement pay conflicted with federal 
law in two respects: first, retirement pay differs 
from a pension because, unlike a pension, it is not 
deferred compensation for services performed 
182. 439 U.S. at 591 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
183. Id. at  581, quoting Wetrnore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 
68, 77 (1904). 
184. 439 U.S. at 583. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40. 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53. 
187. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). 
188. 454 U.S. 46 (1981). 
during the marriage, but rather is current com- 
pensation for continuing, although reduced, serv- 
ices; and second, retirement pay is a personal enti- 
tlement payable to the retired serviceperson for 
life. lag 
In a common law case from Maine, Ridgway v .  
Ridgway,lgO the Court held that the Servicemen's 
Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA), which gives 
members of the armed forces the right to desig- 
nate and change the beneficiaries of their govern- 
ment life insurance policies, pre-empted a state 
court decree in a divorce proceeding that awarded 
the proceeds of the policy to the former spouse 
and children of the serviceperson. The Court said 
that Wissner controlled, protecting the serviceper- 
son's right to designate his or her beneficiary.lg1 
The statute included an anti-attachment provi- 
sion to which the Court applied its interpretation 
of the anti-attachment provision in Hisquierdo. 
"What was said of the statute under consideration 
in Hisquierdo . . . is applicable without qualifica- 
tion here. . . . We find nothing to indicate that 
Congress intended to exempt claims based on 
property settlement agreements from the strong 
language of the anti-attachment provision."lg2 
It is unclear what direction the Court will take 
in future cases involving possible pre-emption of 
state family-property law because the Burger 
Court's willingness to pre-empt in decisions in- 
volving distribution of assets upon divorce con- 
trasts sharply with its usual deference to state in- 
terests. As the Ninth Circuit recently noted: 
"With respect to preemption the Supreme Court's 
emphasis varies from time to time. At times the 
preemption doctrine has been applied with na- 
tionalistic fervor while during other periods with 
generous tolerance of state involvement in areas 
already to some extent the subject of national con- 
 ern.'''^^ It is possible that the Supreme Court will 
require any program of pension benefits enacted 
at the federal level to pre-empt state community 
property law. Application of loose pre-emption 
standards could lead to wholesale pre-emption of 
state community property laws by federal legisla- 
tion, thereby stripping community property of 
189. 453 U.S. at  221-32. 
190. 454 U.S. 46 (1981). 
191. Id. at 55-56. 
192. Id. at 61. 
193. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 976 (9th Cir. . 
1980), cert. den. ,  449 U.S. 983 (1980). 
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any practical significance. Ont: commentator calls 
the Hisquierdo decision: 
[A] stab in the back [for American com- 
munity property law]. . . . It cuts at the 
very heart of community property: the 
principle of equal ownership of gains by 
either spouse during marriage. Unless the 
system is subjected to a major overhaul, 
there is no more equality for the mar- 
riage subject to this alleged intermed- 
dling by Congress. . . . [Clongress 
would have no reason at all to throw 
such kind of monkey wrench into the 
marital property machint:ry of the eight 
community property states. Prior to His- 
quierdo, the state courts had almost al- 
ways found no such hostility on the part 
of Congress when it enacted statutes call- 
ing for the payment of federal funds to 
married persons. . . . [Slince numerous 
federal statutes . . . take account of the 
existence of community property in some 
states and make special provision to ac- 
commodate [it], there was every reason 
to believe that Congress had an intent 
not to disturb community property 
law. lg4 
Whatever the long-term effects of Hisquierdo 
on American community property law may be, 
194. Reppy, Learning to Live with Hisquierdo, 6 COM- 
MUNITY PROP. J .  5, 5, 7-8 (1979). 
the short-term implications are clear. The lan- 
guage in ~ i s ~ u i e r d i  characterizing the retirement 
benefits as the exclusive entitlement of the em- 
ployee spouse prohibits including their value 
among the assets to be divided upon dissolution of 
the marriage. The language is conclusive in com- 
munity property states since it characterizes the 
benefits as the employee spouse's separate prop- 
erty. lg5 
By recognizing the Railroad Retirement Act 
benefits as community property, better results 
would have been reached. Such a decision would 
have properly recognized and affirmed the value 
of contributions made by both partners to the 
marriage, particularly where one partner's contri- 
butions were primarily non-financial. In addi- 
tion, because both partners would receive either a 
guaranteed income or lump-sum settlement of the 
Act's benefits, a number of post-divorce financial 
disputes would probably be eliminated, thereby 
providing some relief to our overburdened court 
system. 
195. It may also be conclusive in equitable distribution 
states, although in some of those states, separate property 
may be considered in making an equitable division of mari- 
tal property. For a discussion of equitable distribution, see 
Comment, Equitable Distribtrtion of Property in New Jer- 
sey, 28 RUTCERS L.  REV. 447 (1974). For a list of states which 
have enacted equitable distribution, see [Reference File] 
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 11 400:iii-400:v. However, if Congress' 
intent that the benefits be paid solely to the employee spouse 
is to be effectuated, benefits should theoretically be unreach- 
able in equitable property divisions. 
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